Binance traces $6.34 billion breach to fake job interview
Binance says a fake interview helped attackers reach its wallet signing service and move $6.34 billion; EIP-7702 permissions outlasted its withdrawal shutdown.
The Finality Desk4 min read#491619

Binance says attackers moved approximately $6.34 billion in digital assets after a fake job interview helped them compromise employees and reach the exchange’s wallet signing service. In its initial incident report published November 3, the exchange said the transfers bypassed its normal withdrawal process and used Ethereum’s EIP-7702 authorization mechanism to give an attacker-controlled contract execution rights over a hot wallet.
Binance’s report describes a campaign that began months before the October 29 transfers. It says the FBI attributes the incident to North Korea. The investigation is ongoing, and Binance says its findings will undergo independent review.
How did the fake interview compromise Binance staff?
In September, an attacker posing as a project director contacted a Binance software engineer through a legitimate job platform. A purported HR representative held a video interview and shared a social media account with personal photos to build trust. In a second interview, a person claiming to lead a fictitious company asked the engineer to download a coding assignment to his work computer.
Binance says the assignment contained a malicious code repository. Its setup process replaced a legitimate development tool component with a malicious version, which could run commands and contact an attacker-controlled server. Endpoint security did not detect the zero-day malware at the time.
The interview was one part of the access chain. Binance says that in June, a different engineer had downloaded a tampered Homebrew installation while looking for an AI coding tool. The exchange detected the anomaly, replaced the device and rotated credentials, but says the engineer’s role and colleagues on the wallet infrastructure team remained exposed.
On October 20, the attackers used the computer compromised through the interview and an internal AI tool to gain control over a Wallet DevOps engineer and another wallet software engineer. Binance says the DevOps engineer’s computer held a container deployment permission token. On October 29, attackers used stolen credentials to access another engineer’s computer, deploy a container and run a malicious script.
How did the signing service enable on-chain transfers?
Binance says the attacker used unauthorized access to its internal wallet signing service to initiate transactions outside the exchange’s usual withdrawal flow. Between 20:05 and 20:09 UTC, five hot wallets sent 233.46 million XRP to an attacker-controlled address. Binance also reported transfers of about 970,500 SOL and 44.2 million OP from hot wallets on Solana and Optimism, followed by a transfer of 18,270 BTC.
The attacker then used the signing service to establish EIP-7702 authorizations. The Ethereum mechanism lets an account delegate certain execution rights to a smart contract without exposing its private key. Binance says the authorizations gave an attacker-controlled contract partial execution rights over a hot wallet. The attacker submitted 50 signing transactions to manipulate the account nonce and establish those delegations.
That on-chain permission outlasted Binance’s normal withdrawal controls. Suspending withdrawals and shutting down hot-wallet services did not invalidate authorizations already established on-chain, so the attacker could continue moving assets outside the normal withdrawal infrastructure.
Why did containment take hours?
Binance says its hot wallet used multi-party computation (MPC), so no single private key was available to revoke the malicious authorizations immediately. The exchange had to develop and execute a specialized revocation procedure. Its report says the final unauthorized transfer, 2,961.9 ETH, finalized on-chain at 23:56 UTC; at 00:10 UTC on October 30, Binance authorized the wallet to delegate to the zero address, clearing the EIP-7702 delegation code.
The exchange says about $2.85 billion in assets had been frozen or intercepted as of its November 3 report, subject to reconciliation and market-price changes. It also said 98% of affected token assets had been replenished by October 31 and that it would absorb the financial impact. CoinDesk’s account of Binance’s briefing likewise reported the fake interview and the EIP-7702 wallet path. Binance says it has rebuilt affected systems and is engaging independent cybersecurity firms to review the incident.
Sources and documents
- initial incident report — binance.com
- CoinDesk’s account of Binance’s briefing — coindesk.com