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Binance traces $6.34B theft from malware to fake job interview

Binance says a months-long intrusion used a fake recruiting process and compromised wallet infrastructure to authorize $6.34 billion in transfers beyond normal withdrawals.

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Binance traces $6.34B theft from malware to fake job interview

Binance says attackers used a fake job interview, compromised employee devices and an internal AI tool to reach its wallet infrastructure before unauthorized transfers of about $6.34 billion on Oct. 29. The exchange’s initial incident report describes a months-long campaign that culminated in abuse of Ethereum’s EIP-7702 authorization mechanism. Binance says the affected assets were moved outside its normal withdrawal process.

The fake interview was one phase, not the campaign’s first foothold. Binance says a Wallet DevOps engineer downloaded a tampered Homebrew installation in June while searching for an AI coding tool. The company detected the anomaly, replaced the device and rotated related credentials, but says the attacker learned the engineer’s role and the identities of wallet infrastructure colleagues.

How did the fake interview give attackers access?

In September, a second engineer was contacted through a legitimate job-hunting platform by someone posing as a project director. A purported HR representative held a live video interview; a purported CEO continued the process in a social chat app. The engineer was asked to download a coding assignment to a work computer. Binance says the repository ran malicious code during setup, replacing a legitimate development-tool component with a malicious version that executed commands and contacted an attacker-controlled server. Endpoint security tools did not detect the malware at the time.

On Oct. 20, Binance says the attacker used the compromised computer and an internal AI tool to gain control of two other engineers’ computers. One belonged to a Wallet DevOps engineer whose device held a container-deployment permission token. Between 17:15 and 19:56 UTC on Oct. 29, the attacker accessed the other engineer’s computer, used stolen credentials to deploy a container and triggered a malicious script.

What let the transfers bypass normal withdrawals?

The attacker gained unauthorized access to Binance’s internal wallet-signing service, which initiated transactions outside the usual withdrawal path. Binance says five hot wallets sent 233.46 million XRP between 20:05 and 20:09 UTC. Hot wallets on Solana and Optimism also sent about 970,500 SOL and 44.2 million OP; a Binance hot wallet sent 18,270 BTC.

On Ethereum, the attacker used EIP-7702 to give a controlled smart contract partial execution rights over a Binance hot wallet. EIP-7702 lets an account delegate certain execution rights to a contract without exposing its private key. Binance says the attacker submitted 50 signing transactions to manipulate the account nonce and establish malicious delegation authorizations. Once those authorizations existed on-chain, suspending withdrawals and shutting down hot-wallet services could not invalidate them.

The wallet used multiparty computation (MPC), so no single private key was available to revoke the authorizations immediately. Binance says the final unauthorized transfer, 2,961.9 ETH, finalized at 23:56 UTC. At 00:10 UTC on Oct. 30, it executed a new authorization from the Binance14 hot wallet to the zero address, clearing the EIP-7702 delegation code.

Who was blamed, and how much has Binance recovered?

The FBI attributed the theft to North Korea and identified the activity as TraderTraitor. It said it observed the actors converting stolen assets primarily into Ether. Binance’s Nov. 3 report put the amount frozen or intercepted at about $2.85 billion, subject to reconciliation and price changes. It said 98% of impacted token assets had been replenished as of Oct. 31, with the exchange covering the loss.

Binance says its investigation is ongoing and that independent security firms will review its findings. Its account shows how access to signing infrastructure, combined with on-chain delegation, extended the incident beyond the point when normal withdrawals were suspended.

Sources and documents